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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES PRESENTED 
This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of a statute for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. WestermanT 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah App. 
1997). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1953 as amended) 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant appeals his conviction of Interference With a Peace Officer in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953 as amended), as adopted by American Fork City ordinance, 
after a bench trial held before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani on October 8, 1999. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Defendant was charged by an Information filed August 17, 1999 with Interference 
With a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953 as amended), as adopted 
by American Fork City ordinance. (R. at 6). A bench trial was held on October 8, 1999 before 
the Honorable Howard H. Maetani. At the close of the City's evidence, Defendant moved to 
dismiss the charge. (Tr. at 24). Defendant argued that dismissal was proper because the officers 
had not effected a lawful arrest or detention of anyone. (Tr. at 24-25). Defendant further argued 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that Defendant had knowledge that peace 
officers were seeking to effect a lawful arrest. (Tr. at 25). Defendant's motion was denied by the 
trial court and the defense did not present evidence. (Tr. at 26). Closing arguments were 
presented by counsel and the court found Defendant guilty as charged. (Tr. at 26-33). Defendant 
was then sentenced by the court. (Tr. at 33). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 10, 1999, Officer Aundre Leavitt was in American Fork City working in 
his specialized assignment with the Utah County Gang Task Force, assisting American Fork City 
law enforcement at the Steel Days carnival held annually in American Fork. (Tr. at 4-5). Officer 
Leavitt is a Provo City police officer who has worked with the gang task force for nine years. IJL 
In fulfilling his specialized assignment on this occasion, Officer Leavitt and approximately nine 
other officers from the task force were interviewing and documenting individuals who were 
known gang members and others who were associating with known gang members. (Tr. at 7-8). 
The officers were dressed in a manner that identified themselves as police officers. (Tr. at 6). 
The officers were investigating a fight between American Fork gang members and 
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Payson gang members that had occurred the previous night, and were also attempting to prevent a 
recurrence of similar violence. (Tr. at 6, 12, 14). The offices had information that the Payson 
gang was going to retaliate that night, and that a gun may be involved. (Tr. at 6, 21, 23). Also, 
the officers were investigating a gang altercation that had occurred a week earlier in Pleasant 
Grove. (Tr. at 5). While conducting their investigation at the Steel Days carnival, the officers 
encountered and identified several gang members that were suspected as being involved in the 
previous gang altercations. (Tr. at 6-7). These individuals were then detained by the officers for 
the purpose of interviewing them and obtaining their photographs. (Tr. at 8, 20). 
As the officers were leading the detained gang members to the front of the carnival 
to do their interviews, an individual later identified as Defendant Luis Pena-Flores stepped 
forward and told the gang members that they didn't have to go with the officers and answer any 
questions, and that they didn't have to allow the officers to take their photographs. (Tr. at 8). 
Officer Leavitt told Defendant to shut his mouth and step back out of the situation. (Tr. at 9). 
Defendant again stepped forward and interfered with the officers who were attempting to 
interview the gang members. Id Defendant was not a part of the officers' investigation in any 
way prior to stepping forward and telling the gang members not to cooperate. (Tr. at 8, 23). 
Defendant's actions on this occasion caused other individuals present to get agitated and his 
actions threatened to create a combative situation involving the police and the crowd. (Tr. at 9, 
17-18). 
At that point, Officer Leavitt told Defendant that he was now part of the party, 
took hold of him, and escorted him to the front of the carnival for the purpose of interviewing 
him. (Tr. at 9). Officer Leavitt asked Defendant for identification and Defendant stated that he 
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didn't have to provide any. I$L Officer Leavitt then asked Defendant if he had any identification 
on him. Defendant replied that he had some in his pocket. Officer Leavitt then told Defendant 
that he needed to show him the identification. (Tr. at 9-10). Defendant refused. (Tr. at 10). 
Officer Leavitt then placed Defendant under arrest and obtained the identification from his pocket. 
The identification identified Defendant as Luis Pena-Flores. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953 as 
amended) and applied it to the facts presented by this case. The statute requires the City to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care 
should have had knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention, 
and then interfered with the arrest or detention by either refusing to perform any act required by 
lawful order (a) necessary to effect the lawful arrest or detention; and (b) made by a peace officer 
involved in the arrest or detention, or by his refusal to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
Defendant's argument is that this was an illegal arrest or detention of the gang 
members and therefore, his actions that interfered with the officers' detention failed to satisfy the 
elements of the crime. This argument ignores both precedent and the plain language of Section 
76-8-305. The statute requires that officers be seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention and 
does not state that the arrest or detention must in and of itself be lawful. Adopting the 
interpretation that is suggested by Defendant would require that citizens determine the legality of 
police action in the street at the time of the police action, and then give them license to resist the 
police action by force or violence or other means if they have determined that the police action 
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was not "lawful." This interpretation is inconsistent with legal precedent and could not have been 
intended by the legislature. 
In any event, the officers detention of the gang members on this occasion was 
lawful as it was based on reasonable suspicion that these individuals were involved in the 
commission of a crime. Therefore, the trial court's interpretation of Section 76-8-305 as applied 
to the facts of this case was correct and Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-8-305 AND APPLIED IT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1953 as amended) states: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in its finding that the gang members 
were "detained" by the police, and that the police action in this case was really a consensual, 
"level-one" police encounter with citizens. This argument ignores the facts of this case as shown 
by the evidence presented. The officers were investigating a fight between known gangs that had 
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occurred the previous night and on this occasion, encountered members of the gangs that were 
known to be involved. The officers did not know who all of the participants in the fight were and 
proceed to investigate by detaining the known gang members and interviewing them. Officer 
Leavitt testified that the gang members were detained by the officers. Clearly, the court's finding 
that the gang members were detained at the time of Defendant's interference was correct. 
Defendant argues that one of the elements of Section 76-8-305 is that the 
interference must be with a lawful level-two detention or level-three arrest and that because this 
was a level-one encounter, the trial court erred in convicting Defendant. This argument ignores 
the plain language of the statute. The element that the City must prove is that the officers are 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention. The level-one, level-two or level-three analysis is 
unnecessary and immaterial to the trial court's finding. What is required is that the City show that 
the officers were seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention, which could involve a level-one 
encounter, a level-two detention, or a level-three arrest. On all levels of police-citizen encounters 
that are the result of a legitimate police investigation, the police are seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention, and a person who interferes with the officers' actions would violate Section 
76-8-305. In any event, the evidence presented at trial showed clearly that the officers had 
detained the gang members to conduct an investigation into gang-related criminal activity that had 
recently occurred, and that Defendant knowingly interfered with this detention. 
Defendant's next argument is that the officers' detention of the gang members in 
this case was not lawful, and therefore, no lawful detention occurred that could be interfered with 
by Defendant and he cannot be convicted under the statute. Defendant's proposed interpretation 
of the statute in this regard would require that citizens determine the legality of police action as it 
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occurs in the street, and then allow them to interfere with such action if they determine that the 
police action is unlawful. Defendant's argument is misplaced. 
In State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a similar question. In Gardiner, the defendant was convicted of assault on a police 
officer and interference with an officer. The Uintah County Sherrif s Department had received an 
anonymous complaint that a loud party was taking place at the Vernal City Airport and that 
minors were consuming alcohol at the party. At about 3 a.m., a sherrif s deputy went to 
investigate along with two Vernal City police officers. I&. at 569. An officer observed a person 
attempting to close a sliding door of a building and went to investigate. He saw what he believed 
were minors inside and smelled the odor of alcohol. The officer announced that he was going to 
enter the building and check for the presence of minors. At that point, Gardiner stepped forward 
and stated that the building belonged to his father and asked the officer for a warrant. The officer 
stated that he did not have a warrant. Gardiner replied that the officer could not enter and 
blocked the doorway. The officer then pushed Gardiner, who fell backward onto a table which 
collapsed under him. Gardiner got up and rushed the officer, punching him in the face. A fight 
ensued that involved the other officers and involved Gardiner again punching the officer in the 
face after being told that he was under arrest. M, Gardiner was eventually subdued and taken to 
jail. 
The court analyzed the language of the assault on an officer statute that requires 
that an officer be acting pursuant to his authority at the time he is assaulted. Gardiner argued on 
appeal that because the officer was conducting an illegal search when he forced his way into the 
building, that he was not acting pursuant to his authority and this element of the statute was not 
7 
satisfied. The court rejected Gardiner's argument. Much of the court's opinion dealt with an 
individual's right to forcibly resist an illegal search or arrest by police. The court stated: 
Where the officer is not acting wholly outside the scope of his or her 
authority, the police action may not be resisted. The fine question of legality must 
be determined in subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street. 
I i at 574. 
In State v. Holeman. 693 P.2d 89 (Wash. 1985) (en banc), the Washington 
Supreme Court addressed a similar question to the one presented by the instant case. In 
Holeman, the defendant was arrested for obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his 
official duties. He argued that his arrest was invalid and therefore, his subsequent confession 
should be suppressed. Holeman was a suspect in a bicycle theft investigation. Police officers 
went to his house to question him about the theft. In the process of questioning Holeman, 
Holeman's father became angry with the officers and stated that they could not arrest him without 
a warrant. IJL at 90. The officers read Holeman his Miranda rights and decided to question him 
at the police station, even though they did not have a warrant. At this point, Holeman's father 
grabbed a crowbar and raised it above his head in a threatening manner. Li. The officers drew 
their guns and entered the house to place Holeman's father under arrest for obstructing a public 
servant. Holeman then made efforts to prevent his father's arrest and was also arrested for the 
obstructing charge. Holeman subsequently provided a confession to the bicycle theft, for which 
he was charged. IdL 
Holeman argued that he had the right to assist his father in resisting what he 
believed to be an illegal arrest of his father. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed. I$L at 91. 
According to the court, 
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[T]he arrestee's right to freedom from arrest without excessive force that 
falls short of causing serious injury or death can be protected and vindicated 
through legal processes, whereas loss of life or serious physical injury cannot be 
repaired in the courtroom. However, in the vast majority of cases, as illustrated by 
the one at bar, resistance and intervention make matters worse, not better. They 
create violence where none would have otherwise existed or encourage further 
violence, resulting in a situation of arrest by combat. Police today are sometimes 
required to use lethal weapons for self-protection. If there is resistance on behalf 
of the person lawfully arrested and others go to his aid, the situation can 
degenerate to the point that what should have been a simple lawful arrest leads to 
serious injury or death to the arrestee, the police or innocent bystanders. Orderly 
and safe law enforcement demands that an arrestee not resist a lawful arrest and a 
bystander not intervene on his behalf unless the arrestee is actually about to be 
seriously injured or killed. 
IcL at 91-92 (quoting State v. Westlund. 536 P.2d 20 (Wash. App. 1975)). 
The court further indicated that whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful is immaterial: 
In this situation we see no difference in whether the arrest is lawful or 
unlawful. The third party is usually in no position to judge the initial legality of the 
arrest. 
l± at 92 (quoting Westlund. 536 P.2d 20). 
The Holeman court further stated: 
The determination of whether an arrest is lawful is often difficult and 
should not be left to bystanders who may have only a limited knowledge of the 
relevant law and who may let their emotions control their judgment. 
IcL 
Both the Gardiner and Holeman courts recognized the danger of allowing citizens 
to make a determination in the street of the legality of police action and the increased potential for 
violence if such was allowed. Gardiner. 814 P.2d at 573. Indeed, in the instant case, the police 
interaction with the gang members was peaceful and only threatened to become violent when 
Defendant stepped forward and interfered with the officers. 
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The instant case is analogous to the facts and analysis presented by the Gardiner 
and Holeman cases. Defendant claims that the police detention of the gang members was 
unlawful and that his interference with the officers was therefore justified. He would have this 
Court rule that a private citizen may determine the legality of police action in the street, and then 
justifiably interfere with the police action if the citizen deems the police action illegal. As 
articulated in Gardiner, the legality of police action must be determined in a courtroom, not in the 
street. The officers in this case were clearly seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the 
gang members to investigate criminal activity. The fine technicalities involved in determining the 
legality of the officers' detention are immaterial to the question of whether Defendant interfered 
with their actions in seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention. The critical inquiry is whether 
the officers were in pursuit of a lawful arrest or detention at the time of Defendant's interference. 
In this case, there can be no question that they were. 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Defendant knew that the officers were 
police officers and interfered with their investigation and detention of known gang members and 
gang associates by yelling and telling the gang members that they didn't have to cooperate with 
the officers. After being told by Officer Leavitt to stop interfering and step out of the situation, 
Defendant again interfered in the same manner. Officer Leavitt then detained Defendant to 
determine his motives and asked Defendant for identification. Defendant refused to provide 
identification to Officer Leavitt. Officer Leavitt then asked Defendant if he had identification and 
Defendant replied that he did. Officer Leavitt again told Defendant to give him the identification 
and Defendant again refused. At this point, Defendant was arrested and Officer Leavitt obtained 
his identification. 
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Defendant's act of refusing to provide identification that would assist Officer 
Leavitt in the detention violated Section 76-8-305. Clearly, Defendant was detained and Officer 
Leavitt gave him a lawful order to provide identification that was necessary to effect the 
detention. This refusal to provide Officer Leavitt with identification on Defendant's part could 
also sustain his conviction pursuant to Section 76-8-305. 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS' DETENTION WAS PROPER AND BASED ON 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Even if, as Defendant argues, the lawfulness of the officers' detention is material, 
the officers effected a lawful detention of the gang members in this case. It is well-established 
that an officer may detain an individual if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual 
was involved, is presently involved or will be involved in the commission of a crime. Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. IJL at 
21; Kaysville City v. Mulcahy. 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App. 1997). Furthermore, "reasonable 
suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably 
less than preponderance of the evidence. Illinois v. Wardlow. U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-
76 (2000). The Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for 
making the stop. The officer must be able to articulate more than an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" of criminal activity. IJL at 676 (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. at 27). 
In the instant case, the standard required for a showing of reasonable suspicion 
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was met by the City. The gang task force officers knew of a fight the previous night involving 
gangs from American Fork and Payson. The officers knew what gangs were involved and knew 
the identity of some of the individuals that were involved. However, the officers did not know 
who all of the participants were and were still investigating. At the American Fork carnival, the 
officers encountered members of the gangs that were involved in the previous night's fight. These 
individuals were detained by the officers to interview them and determine their involvement in the 
fight, and also to document their gang membership. The officers clearly had a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion based on information they had and their observations that justified their 
detention of the gang members on this occasion. 
Defendant's interference with the officers' lawful detention of the gang members 
on this occasion supports his conviction. The trial court did not err in its interpretation of Section 
76-8-305 and there is no basis for reversal on this point of Defendant's argument. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff/Appellee American Fork City asks that this Court 
affirm the trial court's conviction of Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J day of June, 2000. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
Bruce R. Murdock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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